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Summary 
Adaptive (path dependent) processes of growth modeled by urn schemes are important for 
several fields of applications: biology, physics, chemistry, economics. 
In this paper we present a review of studies that have been done in the technological dy- 
namics by means of the urn schemes. Also several new macroeconomic models of technological 
dynamics are analysed by the same machinery and its new modification allowing to  tackle non- 
homogeneity of the face space. We demonstrate the phenomena of multiple equilibria, different 
convergence rates for different limit patterns, locally positive and locally negative feedbacks, limit 
behavior associated with non-homogeneity of economic environment where producers (firms) are 
operating. 
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1 Introduction 
Technical change typically involves diversity amongst the agents who generate or are effected 
by it; various forms of learning often based on trial - and - error procedures; and mechanisms 
of selection which reward paricular types of technologies, agents or behaviors a t  the expenses of 
others. 
These appear to be, indeed, general features of the competitive process driving economic 
dynamics. "Competition" entails the interaction among heterogeneous firms embodying different 
technologies, different expectations and, quite often, displaying different behaviours. Moreover, 
it is often the case that technological and organizational learning is associated with various types 
of externalities and increasing returns. 
Over the last two decades, a t  last, such dynamic phenomena have drawn an increasing 
attention within the economic discipline - especially with reference to  technological change. A 
number of conceptual approaches and mathematical tools have been applied, often benefiting 
from contemporary developments in the analysis of dynamical systems in natural sciences. 
In this work, we shall discuss some of these approaches and, in particular, present the 
basic structure and the interpretation scope of one "formal machinery", namely genemlized urn 
schemes. In section 2 ,  we shall outline some phenomena which are central to  technological and 
economic dynamics, and briefly review alternative formal representations of them. Section 3 
introduces the basics of urn schemes. In the following sections we illustrate some applications to 
relatively simple competitive environments (section 4), and further refinements, contemplating 
local feedback processes (section 5); phenomena of increasing returns deriving from system 
compatibility (section 6); non-homogeneous environment (section 7). Finally, in the conclusion 
we shall point out some promising areas of application of this formal apparatus, including the 
economics of innovation, industrial dynamics, macroeconomics, finance. 
2 Processes of Economic Evolution 
In very general terms, the impulses driving economic change stem, first, from variations in the 
knowledge and physical resourses upon which individual agents can draw in order to  pursue 
their activities; second, from the process by which agents learn, adapt, invent - on the grounds 
of whatever they perceive to  be the available knowledge and resourses, and, third, from the 
interactions amongst the agents themselves. Of course, these sourses of change are by no means 
independent: for example, learning activities obviously affect the available knowledge and the 
efficiency by which resourses are used; interactions might trigger learning and entail externalities; 
learning itself may be associated with particular forms of economic activity, such as learning - 
by - doing. The variety of sourses and mechanisms of economic change highlighted by economic 
history, most likely, in our view, precludes the identification of some unique or archetypical 
dynamic form which could apply across industries, phases of development, historical context. 
Still, it might be possible (and indeed is a challenging area of research) t o  identify few relatively 
invariant characteristics of the process of change and, with them, also the "formal machineriesn 
most apt to  represent them. 
Some basic features of economic evolution are the following: (i) imperfect and time-consuming 
microeconomic learning; (ii) microheterogeneity; (iii) most often, various form of increasing re- 
turns - especially in the accumulation of knowledge - and non-linearities; (iv) aggregate dy- 
namics driven by both individual learning and collective selection mechanisms; (v) "orderlyn 
structural properties resulting from non-equilibrium fluctuations. 
Correspondingly, let us examine the formal representations which can account for a t  least 
some of these features of evolutionary dynamics. As a general reference, let us start from "order 
- through - fluctuationn dynamics (cf. Nicolis and Prigogine (1971) and (1989), Prigogine 
and Stengers (1984)): i t  is a quite broad paradigm for the interpretation of complex non- 
linear processes, initially developed with reference to  physical chemistry and molecular biology, 
but more generally emphasizing the properties of self-reinforcing mechanisms and out - of - 
equilibrium self-organization. Such systems turn out to be sensitive to  (however small) early 
perturbations and display multiplicity of patterns in their long-term behaviour. The cumulation 
of small early disturbances (or small disturbances around unstable states) "pushesn the system 
toward one of these patterns and thus "selectn the structure toward which the system will 
eventually tend. These properties apply to  a very wide class of dynamical systems, highlighting, 
loosely speaking, some general "evolutionary" features well beyond the domain of social sciences 
and biology. 
Further specifications of evolutionary dynamics come from mathematical biology (see Eigen 
and Schuster (1979)). Evolution in many of such models occurs in a way that some integral 
characteristics (mean fitness for biological systems or mean Ucompetitiveness" in the economic 
analogy) "improves" along the tragectory. In the simplest case of Fisher's selection model, "im- 
provements" straightforwardly imply that the mean fitness increases along the path. However, 
even in biology this equivalence does not hold in general (due, for example, to  phenomena of 
hyperselection, co-evolution, symmetry-breaking: see Allen (1988) and Silverberg (1988) for dis- 
cussions directly linked to  economic applications). Even more so, this non-equivalence between 
"evolution" and "increasing fitness", however defined, is likely to  emerge whenever there is no 
identifiable "fundamental law of nature" or conservation principle. Putting it another way: evo- 
lutionary dynamics - in biology as well as in economics - involves some kind of selection process 
grounded on the relevant distributions of agents' characteristics, on the one hand, and on some 
environmental criterion of "adaptiveness", on the other. (Until recently, most economic models 
have avoided the issue simply by assuming that all the agents were perfectly "adapted", either 
via some unspecified selection process that occured just before the economist started looking a t  
the world or via some optimization process that occured in the head of the agents themselves.) 
Replicator dynamics is a common formal tool to  represent such selection-driven adaptation (for 
applications to  economics, see Silverberg el al. (1988) and with reference to  game-theoretical 
problems, Banerjee and Weibull (1992), Cabrales (1992), Kandori et al. (1990)). However, a t  
least the simplest replicator process impose quite strigent conditions on the ways selection oc- 
curs. In essence, these restrictions turn out to  be negative feedbacks, i.e. diminishing returns, 
deriving from some underlying "conservation principlen1. On the contrary, positive feedbacks 
lead to  multiple limit states and generate a much richer variety of trajectories which the system 
may follow. For example, i t  is increasingly acknowledged that  technological innovations are 
likely t o  involve some forms of dynamic increasing returns - hence, positive feedbacks - along 
their development and diffusion (cf. Freeman (1982), Dosi el al. (1988), Anderson el al. (1988), 
David (1993), and for an interpretation of the empirical evidence, Dosi (1988)). Relatedly, these 
is no guarantee that the particular economic outcome which happens t o  be historically selected 
amongst many notional alternatives will be the "best" one, irrespectively of the "fitness" or 
welfare yardstick. 
'Conventionally, in economics, profit (or utility) maximization under a constraint of given and ecarse resoursee 
clearly performs this role. 
Concerning the mathematical tools that have been proposed within and outside economics 
for the analysis of the competitive process, ordinary differential equations have a paramount im- 
portance (not surprisingly, since they are also the most common language of modern science and 
especially physics). They are applied to most analyses of economic and technological dynam- 
ics (for our purposes here, cf. Nelson and Winter (1982), Polterovich and Henkin (1988), Day 
(1992), and the works surveyed in Boldrin (1988); in general cf. Brock and Malliaris (1989)). 
In particular ordinary differential equations with trajectories on the unit siniplex - i.e. of the 
replicator type - borrow, as already mentioned an idea of selection-driven evolution from biol- 
ogy (cf. Silverberg et al. (1988))~. For stochastic (Markov) perturbations of these equations 
see Nicolis and Prigogine (1971) - for general equations - and Forster and Young (1990), - 
for equations of the replicator type. However, while these continuous-time formulations work 
well, they involve a not so harmless approximation for events that are by nature discrete (the 
main example being a phase space which is discrete and changes by discrete increments). More 
intuitively, the continuous-time approximation is bound to  take very literally the old saying that 
natum non facet saltum. 
Moreover, from a technical point of view, the approximation carries unnecessary hypotheses 
of mathematical nature ( a  classical example is the Lipschitz condition on the coefficients of the 
differential equation describing the system) and specific difficulties (such as the requirement 
of rigorously defining the stochastic perturbations of replicator equations). In this respect, it 
might be worth mentioning here some recent results from so-called "evolutionary gamesn showing 
convergence to  conventional Nash-type equilibria in the continuous approximation but not in 
the discrete formulation (Banerjee and Weibull (1992), Dekel and Scotchmer (1991)). Moreover, 
formal representations of selection processes in economics often rely on replicator dynamics 
satisfying the monotonicity condition (Friedman (1991), Samuelson and Zhang (1991), Banerjee 
and Weibull (1992)) (loosely speaking, the condition guarantees that, given an environment, 
there is no reversal in the "forces of selectionn along the trajectory). However, even in simple 
cases the results on limit properties obtained under replicator dynamics night not hold under 
more general selection processes (see, for example, Cabrales (1992)). 
To summarize this brief overwiev of the formalisms applied t o  economic dynamics and evo- 
lution: ideally, one would like some machinery able to  capture as adequately as possible (a) 
increasing-returns phenomena, i.e. positive feedbacks; (b) "uglyn and badly behaved selection 
dynamics, involving also "jumpsn and discontinuities, co-evolutionary effects, etc.; and (c) a large 
'Of course, this does not bear any implication for the sources of 'mutation" upon which environmental selection 
operates. For example, Silverberg et 01. (1988) assume an exogenous drift in innovative opportunities with learning 
- by - using and diffusion-related externalities. 
variety of individual processes of adaptation and innovation (and, thus, being quite agnostic on 
the processes driving the perturbations). 
In the following, we shad assess t o  what extend an alternative class of models, namely 
genernlized urn schemes, can fulfdl these tasks. These schemes, sometimes called non-linear 
Polya pmesses or adaptive pmesses of growth, generate stochastic discrete-time dynamic sys- 
tems with trajectories on the set of points with rational coordinates from the unit simplex (cf. 
Arthur (1988), Arthur et al. (1983) and (1987c), Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991), Dosi et al. 
(1991), Arthur and Ruszczinski (1992)). The mathematical background comes from Hill et al. 
(1980) and Arthur et al. (1983), (1987a) and (1988). This formal apparatus enables one to  
handle positive and/or negative feedbacks (possibly coexisting in the same process): see Arthur 
(1988) and Arthur et al. (1987~).  In particular these feedbacks may have a "localn nature - in 
the sense that they may occur only under paricular states on the trajectories (Dosi et al. (1991)). 
This approach allows also to  treat complementarities and network externalities in the adoption 
of competing technologies (Arthur et al. (1987b)), whereby individual commodities - say, com- 
puters or telecomunication equipment - operate within networks requiring compatibility3. It 
must be also emphasized that in this work we generally suggest examples of application of this 
formalism drawn from the economics of innovation, but similar properties can easily be found in 
many other economic domains: rather than technologies, one could also consider e.g. organiza- 
tional forms or strategies in business economics; cognitive models and decision rules in finance; 
etc. (see the final section). Using the generalized urn schemes one can analyse the emergence 
of random market structure with more than one limit state occuring with positive probability 
(cf. Arthur et al. (1983) and also Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991)). Moreover, one may determine 
the different convergence rates to  the various limit states attainable with positive probability 
(Arthur et al. (1988)). 
In this work we shall analyse some of the patterns of system evolution which can be discovered 
by means of generalized urn schemes. In order to do this we shall use some known models of 
technological dynamics and also introduce some novel modification highlighting the complex 
limit structures that  these models generate. 
Let us start with the simplest definition of a generalized urn scheme. 
'System compatibility implies that one ought to consider combinations amongst individual technologies. In 
turn, this can hardly be done by adding to the "technological spacen where choices are made all possible com- 
binations of technologies existing at any one time. At the very least, this procedure would lead to an enormous 
growth in the dimension of the phase space. For example, if N new technologies come to the market, considering 
all their possible combinations would imply the 'explosionn of the dimension of the phase space up to 2N - 1. 
3 The Basic Elements of the Theory of Generalized Urn Schemes 
To simplify the presentation let us restrict ourselves to the case of two competing technologies 
which correspond to urn schemes with balls of two colors (Hill et al. (1980) and Arthur et al. 
(1983)). Think of an urn of infinite capacity with black and white balls. Starting with n, 2 1 
white balls and nb 2 1 black balls into the urn, a new ball is added into the urn at time instants 
t = 1,2.. .. It will be white with probability ft(Xt) and black with probability 1 - ft(Xt). Here 
ft(-) is a function4, which maps R(0,l)  in [0,1] (R(0,l) stands for the set of rational numbers 
from (0,l)). By Xt we designate the proportion of white balls into the urn a t  time t. The 
dynamics of Xt  is given by the relation 
Xt+i = Xt + (t + n, + nb)-l[tt(xt) - Xt], t >_ 1, X1 = n,(n, + nb)-'. 
Here &(z), t 2 1, are random variables independent in t, such that 
1 with probability ft(z) , 
t t ( 4  = 
0 with probability 1 - ft(z) . 
Designate &(z) - E(t(z) = &(z) - ft(z) by Ct(z). Then we have 
Xt+l = xt + (t + nw + nb)-'{[ft(xt) - Xt] + Ct(Xt)}, t 2 1, X1 = n,(n, + nb)-l. (I)  
Due to EC(z) = 0, the system (1) shifts on average a t  time t 2 1 from a point z onto the value 
(t + n, + nb)-'[ft(z) - z]. Consequently limit points of the sequence {Xt} have to belong to 
the 'set of zeros" of the function ft(z) - z (for z E [0, 11). It will really be the set of zeros if 
ft(-) does not depend on t, i.e. ft(.) = f(-), t > 1, for f ( - )  being a continuous function. 
For the general case one needs a specific mathematical machinery to describe this 'set of 
zeros" (see Hill et al. (1980) for the case when the probabilities are discontinuous and do not 
depend on t; and Arthur et al. (1987b) for the case when the probabilities are discontinuous 
functions and depend on t). 
To summarize the properties of the above urn scheme that are important for our purposes 
recall the following: 
1) the process Xt  develops on the one-dimensional unit simplex [O,1] taking (discrete) values 
from the set R(0,l)  of rational points from (0,l)  (more precisely, a t  time t + 1 it can take the 
values i(t + n, + nb)-', n, 5 i 5 nw + 2); 
2) since in general we do not require any regularity of ft(.), t 2 1, the process can display 
a very complicated behavior (for example, its trajectories can 'sweep off" an interval with 
probability 1 (see Arthur et al. (1987b)); 
'When it doer, not depend on t it is called (Hill et ol. (1980)) urn function. 
3) if for a function f ( - )  one has ft(-)  = f(-)  + 6t(-) and SUpzE~(~,1) )6t(z)1 + 0 sufficiently 
fast as t + oo, then, for an isolated root 8 of f ( z )  - z,  one can have convergence of Xt to  B 
with positive or zero probability (we call such points attainable or unattainable, correspondingly) 
depending upon 
in a neighborhood of B (see Hill et 01. (1980), Arthur et 01. (1988) and Dosi et al. (1991)); 
4) the convergence rate to  those 8, to which the process Xt converges with positive proba- 
bility, depends upon the smoothness of f ( - )  a t  8. In particular, if the smoothness decrease from 
differentiability, i.e. 
to the Holder differentiability of the order 7 > 1/2, i.e. 
the order of convergence of Xt to  8 increases from t-'I2 to t-'l('+r) (see Kaniovski and Pflug 
(1992)). 
Now, thinking of the urn as a market, a white ball as a unit of A technology, a black ball as 
a unit of B technology, we can analyse the process of diffusion of A and B on the market (of 
infinite capacity) by means of the forgoing urn scheme. Let us consider first some conceptual 
examples of technological dynamics in homogeneous economic environments, where competing 
firms, producing either one of the technologies, are operating. 
4 Some Examples of Competition Under Global Feedbacks 
in an Homogeneous Economic Environment 
We start with the simplest model which displays (global) positive feedback and, as a consequence, 
multiple (two in this case) patterns of limit behavior. 
Suppose that we have two competing technologies, say, A and B,  and a market with imper- 
fectly informed and risk-averse adopters5. The two technologies have already been introduced 
'Note that some general system properties - such as the multiplicity of limit states under positive feedbacks 
- are independent from the exact characterization of microeconomic decision rules, although the latter influence 
both the processes and the nature of limit structures themselves. 
to the market, say n A  2 1 units of A and n~ 2 1 units of B. Let us study their diffusion on 
the market. At time instants t = 1,2,. . . one new consumer adopts a unit of either technology. 
Since the adopters, in the example here, are incompletely informed and risk-averse, they use 
some "boundedly rational" decision rule to make their choice6. For example, in Arthur et al. 
(1983) and Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991) the following rule was considered: 
R1. Ask an odd number r > 1 of the users of alternative technologies. If the majority of 
them use A, choose A. Otherwise choose B. 
According to this rule, the technologies are symmetric. Alternatively suppose that they are 
not. For example, A comes from a wellknown firm with a lot of "goodwill" and B from a new 
and unknown one. Hence, potential users perceive a different risk in this choice and require 
different evidence. Assume that this correspond to the following rule: 
R2. Fix a E [1/2,1). Ask q 2 3 users of the technologies. If more than aq of them use A, 
choose A. Otherwise choose B. 
Here a measures the relative uncertainty of the adopters concerning the two technologies. If 
a = 112 and q is an odd number, then R2 converts into R1. 
Another interpretation, to  the same effect, of the choice process described by R1 and R2 is in 
terms of increasing returns to the technologies rather than risk-aversion of the adopters: the later 
know that the greater the number of past adopters the bigger are also the improvements which 
a technology has undergone (although the improvements themselves are not directly observ- 
able). Hence, in this case, sampling provides an indirect measure of unobservable technological 
characteristics. 
Rule R1 generates the probability to choose A as a function of its current proportion on the 
market, of the following form 
Here 
sup (6,(2)1 = ~ ( t - ' )  
t€R(O,I) 
and C: stands for the number of combinations from r to  i .  The function pRl(z) - z has three 
roots 0, 112 and 1 on [ O , l ] .  The root 112, satisfying (3), proves to be unattainable, i.e. there 
'In any case, fascinating issue, which cannot be pusued here, regards the meaning of "rationality" in envi- 
ronments driven by positive feedbacks and showing multiple limit states. For example, even if the agents knew 
the "true" urn model, what use can they make of this cognitive representation? How could they be more than 
"boundedly rational"? 
is no feasible asymptotic market structure corresponding to it or, speaking in mathematical 
terms, Xt converges to  this root with zero probability t -, oo (see Glaziev and Kaniovski 
(1991)). The roots 0 and 1, satisfying (2), are attainable, i.e. Xt converges to each of them with 
positive probability for any ratio between n~ 2 1 and n g  2 1. Also the probability for A (B) 
to  dominate in the limit (i.e. that Xt  -+ 1 (Xt -, 0) as t + oo) will be greater than 112 if the 
initial number of units n~ (ng)  of the technology is greater than the initial number of units of 
the alternative technology (for details see Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991)). 
Consequently we observe here a mechanism of 'selection" which is 'history-dependentn: the 
past shapes, in probability, the future, and this effect self-reinforces along the diffusion trajectory. 
Quite similarly, rule R2 generates 
where 
sup (bt(z)I =O(t-I) .  
zER(0,l)  
Here we designate by [a] the largest integer in a. The function pR2(2) - z  has three roots 0 ,0  and 
1 on [0, 11, where 8 2 112 and shifts to  the right as a increases. It can be shown, that similarly 
t o  the previous case, also this rule generates a mechanism for establishing of dominance of one 
of the competing technologies (and both have a positive probability t o  dominate). However, 
one cannot explicitly trace here the influence of the initial frequencies of the technologies on the 
probabilities to dominate. 
The two forgoing examples display (global) positive feedbacks. Examples of (global) negative 
feedbacks can be similarly derived. 
Consider the following rules: 
R3. Ask an odd number r of the users of alternative technologies. If the majority of them 
use A, choose B. Otherwise choose A. 
R4. Fix a E [1/2,1). Ask q 1 3 users of the technologies. If more than aq of them use A, 
choose B. Otherwise choose A. 
If a = 1/2 and q is an odd number, then R4 converts into R3. 
These rules may accommodate behaviors such as the search for diversity in consumption 
or implicitly capture the outcomes of strategic behaviors on the side of the producers of the 
technologies aimed at the exploitation of 'market powern (cf. Dosi et al. (1991) and Glaziev 
and Kaniovski (1991)). We have relations here similar to (4) and (5) with 
and 
In both cases there is unique solution of the corresponding equations pR3(z) - z = 0 and 
pR4(z) - z = 0. For R3 it is 112, and for R4 the root 8 is greater than 112 and increases as a 
increases. The negative feedback determines a limit market structure where by both technologies 
are represented in the market with equal shares (R3) or they share the market in the proportion 
8 : (1 - 8) (the limit for the ratio of the number of units of A to  the number of units of B). 
For both rules, we know the rates of convergence of Xt to the root, i.e. &(xi - 112) for 
R3 or &(xt - 8) for R4 are asymptotically normal as t + w. The means of the limit normal 
distributions equal zero for both cases and one can also specify the corresponding variances (see 
Arthur et al. (1983) for the case of R3). Consequently we can characterize the rate of emergence 
of the limit market structures7. 
More complicated f (.) functions appear if we introduce additional hypotheses concerning the 
characteristics and/or dynamics of the pool of adopters. If we assume that adopters who use some 
k decision rule R; happen with frequency (probability) a; > 0, i = 1 , 2 ,  ,, a; = I), 
then the function ft(.), corresponding to  the behaviour of the whole pool, is a a randomization 
with weights a; of functions f,'(.) generated by the rules R;, i.e. 
The simplest example, whenever adopters who use R1 come up with probability a > 0, while 
those who use R3 come up with probability 1 - a > 0, has been considered in Dosi et al. (1991). 
Beyond these properties of general positive and negative feedbacks, let us now consider those 
more complicated situations with locally positive and/or locally negative feedbacks. 
5 Examples of Technological Dynamics Under Local Feedbacks 
in Homogeneous Economic Environments 
Let us introduce a price dynamics for the two technologies. As in Dosi et al. (1991), assume 
that two firms (producers of A and B, respectively) use the following strategy: up to a certain 
 o or this particular rule one can determine an even sharper asymptotic characterization - the law of iterated 
logarithm (see Arthur et al. (1983)). 
market share, defined by the proportion of the product of the firm among all products which 
have been sold until the current time (usually greater than 112) reduce the price, above that 
level increase it. Let us consider the simplest (linear) case of this policy which is graphically 
represented in figure 1. Here PrA(zA)  designates the dependence of the price of technology A 
P ~ B ( ~ A )  
P ~ A  (ZA ) 1 
0 1-X; 4 1 x A 
Figure 1: Dependence of prices of A and B on the market share of A. 
as a function of its proportion XA among adopters who are using either technology. PrB(xA) 
designates the dependence of the price of the technology B as a function of z ~ .  (Note, that the 
proportions of the technologies A and B are related by: z~ + z~ = 1.) Define z;l and z 5  as the 
"critical" market shares which switch from falling- to rising-price rules. Hence the dependence 
of the price of the A (B) technology on its proportion on the market zA  (zB) is given by four 
parameters: PrA(0), x i ,  PrA(z;l), PrA(l)(PrB(l) ,  zk, PrB(I  - zk), PrB(0))8. 
This price dynamics embodies both positive and negative feedback mechanisms of diffusion. 
Within the domain of positive feedback the price falls with increasing market share possibly 
due to  learning economies, dynamic increasing returns, etc., and/or, on the behavioural side, 
to  market-penetration strategies. Then, above a certain market share, the price, driven by 
'Note that one accounts also for the circumstances when P r A ( l )  5 PrA(z:)  (PrB(0)  5 PrB( l  - z i ) ) ,  such 
as when z: = 1(z i  = 1 ) :  in this case, firm A(B)  still reduces the price on its product as its proportion on the 
market increases. 
negative feedbacks, starts t o  rise, possibly due to  monopolistic behaviours of the firm or to  
the progressive exhaustion of technological opportunities t o  lower production costs. Note that 
the model accounts also for those particular cases when firms follow different "non-symmetricn 
policies - e.g. one increases the price and another lowers it, or both increase (lower) themg, 
or one increases (lowers) price and the other follows the above general strategy. These special 
cases can be obtained from the general one by simply changing the relations between PrA(0), 
It is natural to  suppose that, in the case when the performance of the technologies is approxi- 
mately the same and potential adopters know about it, the technology which is cheaper has more 
chances t o  be sold, i.e. the A technology is bought if PrA(zA)  - PrB(zA)  < 0. However if the 
prices only slightly differ or consumers have some specific preferences (which can be characterized 
only statistically or on average), that may sometimes lead to  the adoption of the more expensive 
technology. This case mathematically can be formalized in the following way (see also Hanson 
(1985)). The A technology is bought if PrA(zA)-PrB(zA)+e < 0, where e is a random variable. 
(Consequently B technology is bought if PrA(ZA) - PrB(zA) + e > 0.) To preserve the symme- 
try of the decision rule we should avoid the situation when the event 'Pre(zA) - PrA(zA)  = en 
has nonzero probability. This is definitely not the case when the distribution of e possesses a 
density with respect to  the Lebesgue measure on the set of real numbers. Consequently we will 
assume that the distribution of ( has a density in R1. The probability f (zA) to  choose the A 
technology, as a function of z ~ ,  equals to  P{e < PrB(ZA) - PrA(ZA)}. To avoid unnecessary 
sophistications of the model, we shall assume that ( has a uniform distribution on [-&,a]. The 
probability to  choose A as a function of ZA in this case has the form 
For a > min;,l,2,s,r A; this is graphically represented in figure 2. Here we have three roots 
- 01,02 and 83 - of the function f (z )  - z on [O , l ] .  Satisfying (3), the root O2 proves to  be 
unattainable, while 81 and 83, satisfying (2), are attainable, i.e. the process Xt converges t o  
each of them with positive probability for any initial proportions of the technologies on the 
market. Using results of Arthur et 01. (1988) we find the rates of convergence to  the attainable 
roots 
'For the case when both lower prices, see Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991) where formally the same situation is 
interpreted somewhat differently. 
Figure 2: Probability to choose A depending on its market-share. 
In particular, 
lim P { f i ( x t  - 9;)  < y, X ,  + 9 ; )  = P { X ,  + ~ ; ) P { N ( o , u ; )  < y). 
t-rm 
Also N ( 0 , u : )  stands for a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance 
where f l ( . )  designates the derivative of f (-). It can be shown that 
and 
One sees from ( 6 )  - ( 9 )  that convergence to  both 81 and O3 occurs with the rate t-'I2 but 
the random fluctuations, which are determined by the variances of the corresponding limit 
distributions, around this dominant can be different. 
In this example, the above dynamics of prices together with the described behaviour of 
adopters generate multiple limit patterns with slightly different rates of emergence. Under the 
same price dynamics and marginally more sophisticated assumptions concerning the behaviour 
of adopters, one can have even more complicated limit market structure where the initial propor- 
tions of the technologies on the market influence those structures (see Dosi et al. (1991)). Similar 
the considerations concerning convergence rates also apply (with corresponding modifications). 
The analytical procedure is to introduce further specifications on the statistical frequences 
(probabilities) of the producers for A(B) to follow a particular shape of the above price dynamics 
and/or hypotheses concerning statistical frequences of the adopters who use variants of the above 
decision rules: thus, one can construct much more complicated functions ft(-). 
Next let us discuss one important generalization of the urn scheme presented so far. 
6 Urn Schemes with Multiple Additions - a Tool for 
Analysis of System Compatibilities 
As mentioned in section 2, quite a few modern high-technology products require compatibility. 
We have also hinted earlier that considering all notional combinations of new technologies as a 
sort of "higher leveln new technologies, although formally possible, does not look too attractive. 
An alternative method for handling inter-technological compatibilities has been introduced by 
Arthur et al. (1987a). For the case of two (A and B) competing technologies it looks like the 
following. 
Consider Z:, the set of two dimensional vectors with non-negative integer coordinates. In- 
troduce g (z ) ,  t > 1, z € R(O, I), independent in t, random vectors with values in 2:. If g ( z )  
takes value ? = (il, i2) we can interpret this both as additions il 2 0 white and i2 2 0 black 
balls into an urn of infinite capacity with black and white balls or as adoptions on a market of 
infinite capacity of il units of A and i2 units of B. 
Mathematical results similar to those presented in section 3 are obtained (see Arthur et al. 
(1987a), (1987b) and (1988)). An important property of this generalization is that &(z) can 
take the value 6 = (0,O) with nonzero probability. Consequently no adoption might happen at 
time t .  Hence, taking into account that the scheme allows multiple adoptions, one sees that 
sequential instances of adoption do not coincide with physical time "periods". Hence, loosely 
speaking, history may "acceleraten by discrete jumps of variable length. 
Further, let us introduce the urn model corresponding to the case when competition occurs 
in non-homogeneous economic environments. 
7 Generalized Urn Schemes with Non-Homogeneous Economic 
Environments 
Think of m urns of infinite capacity with black and white balls. Starting with np 2 1  white 
balls and and nf 2 1  black balls into the i-th urn a ball is added in one of the urns a t  time 
instants t  = 1 , 2 .  . .. It  will be added with probability f i ( 2 ( t ) )  to  the i-th urn. Also it will be 
white with probability f , Y ( x ( t ) )  and black with probability f,!'(zt). Here f i . ) ,  fw( . ) ,  f3(.), 
are vector functions which map R(G, i) in Sm and p(.) + f3(-) = f i - ) .  By R(G, i) we designate 
the Cartesian product of m copies of R ( 0 , l )  and 
Also f ( t )  stands for the vector whose i-th coordinate X i ( t )  represents the proportion of white 
balls in i-th urn a t  time t .  To introduce the dynamics of z ( t )  consider et(z'), t  2 1, z' E R(& i), 
independent in t ,  random m x 2  matrices with the elements (f , j (Z),  i = 1,2 ,  . . . , m ,  j = 1,2 ,  
such that P { G , , ( Z )  = 1 )  = f,Y(Z) and P { q 2 ( Z )  = 1 )  = f!(z'). Then the total number 7: of 
balls in a-th urn a t  time t  > 1  follows the dynamics 
Since 
then, requiring that 
one has 
r ? r f f' 5 liminf' limsup- < 1. 
t-.rm t  t+m t -  
The number wf of white balls and the number bf of black balls in the urn follow the dynamics 
Dividing (14 )  on (10 )  one has the following dynamics for for the proportion of white b d s  in the 
i-th urn 
Since 
relations (13) and (15) allow to  show that 2 ( t )  converges with probability 1 as t + oo to the 
set of zeros (defined properly) on ~ ( 6 ,  i) of the m-dimensional vector-function #(.) whose i-th 
coordinate is fY(5) - z; fi(Z). Assume that both f;(.) and fa(.) are continuous and there is a 
limit X0 for 2 ( t ) .  Then from equality (11) one can conclude that converges with probability 
1 as t + oo and the limit 7 has the form 
Using above relations we can obtain analogs of the results listed in section 3 for the basic 
generalized urn scheme. 
Consider a particular model of technological dynamics in a non-homogeneous economic en- 
vironment which can be treated by means of the modification given here. 
Suppose that we have two possible locations - 1 and 2, for the producers of two competing 
technologies - A and B. At each of the locations there are one firm producing A and one 
firm producing B. Producers use the strategy described in section 5 (with their own sets of 
parameters). Then for each of the locations there exists a minimal price of the technologies as a 
function of the current concentration of, say, A, i.e. M(zA) = min(PrA(zA), PrB(ZA)). For the 
case represented by figure 1, the function is given on figure 3. Note that at  points Xi technologies 
reverse their order as the cheaper ones. Designate the proportion of A for the first and the second 
locations by 21 and 2 2  correspondingly. Also designate by X i ,  j = 1,2,3, i = 1,2, the points 
where the minimal prices switch from one technology to other. (Consequently we consider the 
case when the minimal prices for the both locations have a shape similar to that presented in 
figure 3.) Suppose that at time instants t = 1,2,. . . a consumer buys a unit of either technology. 
He adopts the cheapest among the technologies, but, as before (section 5), because of some 
specific preferences or other reasons which can be taken into account statistically, he measures 
the difference between Ml(zl) and M2(z2) with a random error. Here Mi(.) stands for the 
minimal price for the i-th location as a function of the market-share of A at this location. A 
unit of the technologies from the first location is bought if Ml(zl) - M2(z2) + < 0; otherwise, 
i.e. when M1(z1) - M2(z2)+( > 0, a unit from the second location is bought. As before (section ' 
5) to preserve the symmetry of the decision rule we should avoid the situation when the event 
"M2(z2) - M1(z1) = In has nonzero probability. Consequently we should again assume that 
the distribution of possesses a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure on the set of real 
numbers. The probability to choose the first location is fl(zl ,  22) = P{I < M ~ ( z 2 )  - Ml(z1)). 
Figure 3: The price of the cheapest among A and B technologies as a function of z ~ .  
To simplify our considerations let us suppose that (' has a uniform distribution on [-P, PI. Then 
the probability t o  choose the first location is 
if Mz(z2) - Ml(Z1) 1 P , 
fl(2') = 0 if Mz(z2) - Ml(2l) I -P , 
[M2(zz)-Ml(zl)+PI/2P if -P<Mz(zz ) -Ml (z l )<P .  1 '  
Suppose that P > ma~<z,~ l , ; , l ,2  IM2(z2) - Ml(zl)l. Then (11) holds with 
and 
m.J! [M2(z2) - M1(z1)1I/2P. fi = ll2 - {oszisl,,=l,2 
The simplest decision rule for choosing a specific technology when a location has been chosen 
is the following: a unit of A(B) is adopted a t  the i-th location if z; E I t  2; E I:. Here 
I t  = (0, XI) U(Ai, Xi) and IiB = [Xi, X i ]  U[Ai, 1). The corresponding vector-function p(-) has 
the form 
(1 - z;) f;(Z) for z; E I t  , 
F;(Z) = { 
-x;fi(z) for z; E I: . 
We can show that z ( t )  converges (for any initial number of A and B at the both locations) 
with probability 1 as t + oo to a random vector 2. The limit takes with positive probability 
four values: (Xi, Xi), (Xi, Xi), (Xi, Xi), (Xi, Xi). Finally note that one may easily refine these 
examples by introducing more complicated decision rules (e.g. mixed strategies randomizing the 
choice among technologies after having chosen the location, etc.). 
8 Conclusions 
Innovation and technology diffusion generally involve competition among different technolo- 
gies, and, most often, endogenous changes in the costs/prices of technologies themselves and in 
adopters' choices. In the economic domain (as well as in other disciplines) the formal represen- 
tation of such processes involves some dynamics of competing "populations" (i.e., technologies, 
firms, or even behavioral traits and "models" of expectation formation). A growing literature on 
such dynamics has begun studying the properties of those (generally non-linear) processes that 
innovation and diffusion entails. As by now robustly established, multiple equilibria are normally 
to be expected and "history matters", also in the sense that out-of-equilibrium fluctuations may 
bear system-level consequences on notional asymptotic outcomes. Developing on previous re- 
sults showing - under dynamic increasing returns - the likely "lock-in" of diffusion trajectories 
onto particular technologies, we have presented a formal modeling apparatus aimed at handling 
the interaction between diffusion patterns, on the one hand, and endogenous preferences forma- 
tion and/or endogenous price formation, on the other. As examples, we presented three classes 
of stochastic models of shares dynamics on a market of infinite capacity by two competing new 
technologies. In the first of them, we assumed that the adoption dynamics is essentially driven 
by endogenous changes in the choices of risk-averse, imperfectly informed adopters (or, in a 
formally equivalent analogy, by some positive or negative externality imperfectly estimated by 
would-be users of alternative technologies). In the second example, we considered an endoge- 
nous price dynamics of two alternative technologies, driven by e.g., changes in their costs of 
production and/or by the intertemporal behaviours of their producers. In the third example 
we dealt with the same economic set-up as in the second one, but with an explicit "spatial" 
representation of the location of producers. 
In all of the cases, the diffusion process is allowed to embody some stochasticity, due to e.g., 
"imperfect" learning from other people's choices, marginal and formally undetectable differences 
in users' preferences, or some inertia in adjusting between differently priced but identical-return 
technologies. 
The formal apparatus presented here, based on the idea of the generalized urn scheme, allows 
quite general analytical accounts of the relationships between some system-parameters (e.g., 
proxies for information "imperfectionn by adopters; dynamic increasing returns and monopolistic 
exploitation of new technologies by their producers) and limit market shares. While path- 
dependency (i.e., "history mattersn) applies throughout, the foregoing analytical techniques 
appear t o  be able, a t  the very least, t o  discriminate those which turn out t o  be feasible limit 
equilibria (i.e., those which are attainable with positive probabilities) and, also, t o  discover the 
different rates of emergence of the limit patterns. 
The apparatus can also be used for numerical simulation. In this case it proves t o  be as 
general as ordinary differential equations and as easy t o  implement. By means of numerical 
simulation one can also study much more complicated and "inductively richn models. Still, the 
developed mathematical machinery serves in such numerical studies as a means of prediction 
and verification, showing the general kind of behaviour one ought to expect. Yet another com- 
plementarity between the analytical exploration of these models and their numerical simulation 
concern the study of their non-limit properties, e.g. the "transientn structures that might emerge 
along the trajectories and their degrees of persistence. 
As the foregoing modeling illustrations show, Kmarket imperfectionsn and Kinformational 
imperfectionsn often tend to  foster technological variety, i.e., the equilibrium co-existence of 
different technologies and firms. Moreover, stochasticity in the choice process may well bifur- 
cate limit market-shares outcomes. Finally, it is shown, corporate pricing strategies-possibly 
based on rationally-bounded procedures, imperfect informational and systematically uwrongn 
expectation-formation mechanisms - are generally bound to  influence long-term outcomes. Un- 
der all these circumstances, the foregoing modeling techniques allow, a t  the very least, a Kquali- 
tativen analytical assessment of diffusion/competition processes by no means restricted to  those 
circumstances whereby microeconomic expectations, on average, represent unbiased estimations 
of the future. 
If all this analytical representation is empirically adequate, there seem to  no a priori reasons 
t o  restrict it to  technological dynamics. In fact, under suitable modifications, it may apply as 
well t o  interdependent expectations, decisions and returns in many other economic domains. 
Just t o  give few examples: the evolution of strategies and organizational forms in industrial dy- 
namics; the dynamics of location in economic geography (Arthur (1990)); adaptive processes and 
the emergence of social norms; "mimetic" effects and speculation on financial markets; macroe- 
conomic coordinationlo. The list is likely to  be indeed very long. Ultimately, what we have tried 
t o  implement is a relatively general analytical apparatus able t o  handle at least some qualitative 
 or some works these different domains that link at least in spirit with the approach to economic dynamics 
suggested here, see among others, Kirman (1991), Kuran (1991), Boyer and OrlCan (1992), Durlauf (1991). 
properties of dynamic stochastic processes characterized by both positive, and, possibly nega- 
tive, feedbacks of a functional form as "badly-behavedn as possible. Indeed, we believe, quite a 
few of the processes of economic change fall into this category, related to  technological change 
but also to interdependent (possibly "disequilibriumn) changes in e.g., industrial structures, but 
also financial or product-market expectations and behaviours. 
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